In this paper we examine the influence of economic factors on partisan support for European integration over the last three decades. We find that partisan support is larger in 'poorer' countries with direct economic benefits from EU membership. On the other hand, parties in countries affected by the Maastricht criteria are more Euro-sceptical. We also find weak evidence for larger partisan support in countries with more developed welfare states, and that the support for European integration fluctuates in parallel with the business cycle. Finally, our results indicate that the importance of economic factors in determining partisan support for European integration has grown in recent periods.
Introduction
The European Union (EU) represents a unique process of economic and political integration in recent history. Never since World War II have sovereign countries renounced their competences on economic and political issues to such a great extent as in the process of European integration.
Throughout most of this process there seemed to be a consensus that more integration was beneficial for all EU members. As a consequence, the European Union has assumed more and more competences from its member countries and has steadily gained new members. So, the EU has grown from 6 countries in 1952 to 28 in 2013. However, recently, scepticism on the benefits of European integration has grown in many member countries. For example, in 2005, France and the Netherlands rejected the EU constitution in a referendum. As a consequence, a referendum on the EU constitution in six other EU member countries has been cancelled or postponed indefinitely. In Spain, recently, the supporters of the EU are now in the minority for the first time. (except in the new EU member countries). Since changes in partisan constitutions, which have been used as the main explanatory variables for partisan support for European integration in the literature up to now (cf., , or Hellström 2008 , are unlikely to be the causes of this change, other determinants of partisan support need to be studied. Naturally, economic factors whose importance is analysed in this paper might have played a prominent role. Notes: White colour means that there is no information for that country and the intensity of the red colour corresponds to the intervals: [1, 5] , (5, 5.6], (5.6, 6], (6, 7] . The intervals are chosen as the quantils of the distribution of the mean partisan support for European integration.
To uncover the partisan and economic determinants that have driven partisan support for European integration over the last three decades, we use data from 297 political parties in 24 countries collected in eight waves to test six hypotheses, four of which refer exclusively to the influence of economic factors. The other two hypotheses refer to partisan determinants that have proved to influence partisan contestation over European integration (for example, see Hellström 2008) . Regarding the hypotheses on the economic determinants of partisan support for European integration, first we analyse the influence of direct and indirect economic and monetary benefits, and then we test whether European regulation, the size of welfare states or the business cycle have affected partisan support.
Our results indicate that economic factors have indeed influenced partisan support for European integration in several ways. Partisan support is larger in relatively poorer countries that are supposed to obtain higher benefits from EU membership. On the other hand, it is lower in those countries that were affected by the Maastricht criteria, which indicates that parties worry about losing their influence on national fiscal policies when their countries are controlled by European institutions. Likewise, evidence is weak for larger partisan support in countries with more developed welfare states, and support for European integration increases (decreases) in periods of growth above (below) the average. Finally, dividing our sample period into two subsamples shows that the importance of economic factors in determining partisan support for European integration has increased over time.
The literature on the determinants of partisan support for European integration has not addressed the question of whether partisan contestation over European integration is influenced by economic factors. 2 Instead, the literature has focused basically on two kinds of partisan determinant. The first of these is partisan ideology, which has been found to be related to parties' positioning on European integration according to an inverted U-relationship, with central parties being pro-integrationist and extreme parties being Eurosceptical (Aspinwall 2002; Hellström 2008; Hix 1999; Hix and Lord 1997; Hooghe and Marks 1999; Marks and Steenbergen 2002; Marks and Wilson 2000; . The second kind of partisan determinant that has been taken into account is related to parties' electoral strategies. While well-established parties occupying the ideological centre follow the mainstream and take median voter positions on European integration, peripheral parties try to attract unsatisfied voters by taking more radical positions (Hellström 2008) . Thus, parties in government are found to be more pro-integrationist than parties in the opposition. The same is true for parties with greater electoral success , Hellström 2008 . On the other hand, extreme parties are found to be more sceptical of European integration. We confirm these results in our paper with a larger sample regarding its time, country and partisan dimension.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the hypotheses subjected to empirical testing. Section 3 introduces the data and outlines the estimation procedure. Results are discussed in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5 the results are summarized and their relevance is discussed.
that receive benefits from both net EU transfers and intra-EU trade are more prone to European integration (Doyle and Fidrmuc 2006; Christin 2005; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Eichengerg and Dalton 1993, among others) .
Hypotheses
The literature has explained political parties' contestation over European integration exclusively in terms of ideological and strategic electoral competition motives (Aspinwall 2002; Hellström 2008; Hix 1999; Hix and Lord 1997; Hooghe and Marks 1999; Marks and Steenbergen 2002; Marks and Wilson 2000; Our analysis is based on three sets of hypotheses, each set containing two hypotheses. The first set refers to the ideological and strategic electoral motives that have already been analysed in the literature. The first hypothesis follows in assuming that parties are organizations with embedded ideologies that are grounded on 'Weltanschauungen' that constitute the basis for their positioning towards European integration. In particular, as far as European integration is concerned, partisan positioning is often related to the historical role that parties played in this integration process. According to the literature, partisan contestation over European integration can be located in a two dimensional space (Hooghe and Marks 1999; Hooghe et al. 2010; Marks and Steenbergen 2002; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Marks and Wilson 2002; Hellström 2008) .
One dimension measures parties' economic position on market organization (from 'regulated capitalism' to 'neo-liberalism') and the other considers the extent to which decision making is centralised (from regionalism to a supranationalism). While these two dimensions are in principle independent, they are sometimes closely related to each other and highly correlated to the partisan position on an ideological left/right dimension. Thus, extreme leftand right-wing parties are strongly opposed to European integration; social democratic and conservative parties are generally moderately in favour; and liberal parties are strongly in favour. This results in an inverted U-shaped relationship between ideology and partisan support for European integration (Hellström 2008; . According to this, our first hypothesis is:
H1: Ideology determines the partisan position regarding European integration and follows an inverted U-shape relationship.
The second hypothesis takes account of partisan competition and the fact that a party's final objective is to maximize electoral support so that it can implement its policies. According to Hix and Lord (1997) and Taggart (1998) , the major parties support European integration because their positioning in favour of mainstream policy issues allows them to minimize intra-party tensions. Therefore, parties protect the status quo with a neutral position on such 'new issues' as European integration These benefits can be measured in various ways. As an initial measure, we consider the difference between the member countries' contribution payments to the EU budget and the expenditure of the EU in these countries. While these (net) expenditures are obviously only a part of the economic benefits of EU membership, they need to be taken into account for several reasons. On the one hand, both the contributions to the EU budget and the EU expenditures in member countries are the result of extensive negotiations between member countries. For example, the UK corrections, which reduced the contributions of the UK to the EU budget, were agreed to by the 1984
Fontainebleau European Council after long negotiations. Their press coverage and role in the national elections made voters in member countries more aware of the financial benefits and costs of European integration. Therefore, the position of the median voter regarding European integration should depend on these benefits and costs and, as a consequence, partisan positions towards European integration should also depend on them. On the other hand, because of limited rationality, voters tend to give greater value to direct costs and benefits rather than the indirect costs and benefits of European integration, which are furthermore much more difficult to measure. As a consequence, both voters and parties will give more importance to the financial costs and benefits than to other advantages and disadvantages of European integration.
Another important advance in European integration has been the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU). An important argument in favour of
the EMU is that a common market with a common currency increases trade among EMU member countries. According to Frankel and Rose (2002) , the formation of a currency union allows member countries to triple trade with other currency member countries without diverging trade from non-member countries. They also find that, in the mid-run, a percent increase in total trade raises income per capita by one-third of a percent. This means that the economic benefits from the EMU should be substantial, particularly for large and centrally located economies that, according to the gravity model of trade, should obtain the largest benefits. Therefore, as a second measure of economic benefits, we consider a country's benefits from EMU induced trade which should be positively related to partisan positioning in favour of European integration in these countries. Interestingly, total trade, as a measure related to the one used in this study, has been found to have a positive influence on citizens' support for European integration in McLaren (2004), Anderson and Reichert (1996) and Eichengerg and Dalton (1993) .
Finally, more European integration should lead to the convergence of EU member countries. This economic convergence should primarily benefit those countries that are below the European mean per capita income. Accordingly, Garry and Tilley (2009) find that gross national income has a negative influence on support for European integration in public opinion surveys.
Consequently, we should expect more support for European integration from parties in relatively 'poor' countries than from parties in relatively 'rich' countries. Our third hypothesis is:
H3: Parties' positioning regarding European integration depends positively on the economic benefits of the party's country from such integration.
As mentioned above, European integration implies the centralization of decision making. New supranational institutions assume competencies that formerly belonged to the governments of the member countries and, therefore, were under the control of national parties. This has especially affected economic competencies. The Maastricht criteria in 1992 were a first attempt to control government deficits and debt and, thereby, government spending at the national level. Another example is the creation of the EMU and the introduction of the euro, which delegated the control of the monetary policy in EMU member countries from national institutions to a supranational institution. With hypothesis four we analyse whether partisan positioning regarding European integration has changed in those countries that have been especially affected by the control of supranational European institutions. 4 We use the Maastricht criteria to analyse whether the creation of supranational institutions had a significant influence on partisan positioning towards European integration in those countries with excessive budget deficits and 4 The role of supranational institutional change on the influence of partisan ideology on social expenditure has recently been analysed by Herwartz and Theilen (2013) . They find that, indeed, the creation of supranational institutions has limited partisan influence on social spending in the OECD during the last two decades.
debt, and which did not fulfil the three percent deficit criterion, the 60 percent debt criterion, or both. Our fourth hypothesis is:
H4:
The creation of European institutions that assume national competencies and limit the partisan influence on formerly national policy issues reduces partisan support for European integration.
Our third set of hypotheses takes account of the country's economic situation.
Hypothesis five examines whether there is a relationship between national advances in the welfare state and partisan support for European integration.
As European integration means the convergence of member economies, we could interpret advances in European integration as a reduction of welfare differences among EU member countries. Countries with larger welfare states have median citizens that support more welfare spending and redistribution than countries with smaller welfare states. Therefore, the population in countries with more advanced welfare states could also be expected to be more prone to a reduction of differences in welfare across countries.
Accordingly, our fifth hypothesis is:
H5:
In countries with a larger welfare state, parties are more prone to European integration.
Finally, hypothesis six aims to account for the influence of the business cycle on parties' contestation over European integration. Smith and Wanke (1993) point out that European integration might have heterogeneous effects on countries' economic performance. Thus, even if the total benefits of European integration are larger than its costs, the distribution of these benefits and costs will be unequal across countries. If these costs lead to more unemployment and less growth in some countries (relative to past national performance), they diagnose that the population and the governments in these countries will reduce their support for continued integration. 
Data description and methodology
Our analysis is based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey which merges three data sets: Bakker et al. (2012) , Hooghe et al. (2010) and Ray (1999) . We use the data from eight waves of surveys (1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2006 and 2010) Hellström (2008) , where it is measured as the increment of votes in the last elections. 8 Though Government Participation is a dichotomous variable that takes value 1 when the party is in government and 0 otherwise, it can also take value 0.5 (for both outgoing parties and entering parties) if there is a change of government in the survey year. Notice also that we measure Government Participation differently from . Their variable takes value one when a party has participated in government at least once in the period 1965-1995. 9 We also include in EU Net Expenditure transfers from the EU to Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia before these countries were EU members. 10 Notice that measuring trade as a share of GDP automatically accounts for business cycle fluctuations. 11 The estimated effects of EMU-induced trade are in line with the predictions of the gravity model. Thus, trade benefits are highest for centrally located and large economies (Germany), medium for small centrally located economies (Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands) and large but more peripheral economies (France, Italy, Spain) and almost non-existent for small following Frankel and Rose (2002) equality, to 100, perfect inequality. Benefits from EMU membership induced trade as a share of GDP in percentge points.
Own calculation with data from Eurostat (2013b) Maastricht Debt Noncompliance
Dichotomous variable for countries with a government debt of more than 60% of GDP and a government deficit of less than 3% of GDP (1 = non-compliance).
Own calculation with data from International Monetary Fund (2010)

Maastricht Deficit Non-compliance
Dichotomous variable for countries with a government deficit of more than 3% of GDP and a government debt of less than 60% of GDP (1 = non-compliance).
Own calculation with data from OECD (2012) and Eurostat (2012)
Maastricht Debt and Deficit Noncompliance
Dichotomous variable for countries with both a government debt and deficit of more than 60% and 3% of GDP, respectively (1 = noncompliance).
Own calculation with data from International Monetary Fund (2010), OECD (2012) and Eurostat (2012) Government Debt
Government debt as a share of GDP in percentage points.
International Monetary Fund (2010) Budget Surplus
Government surplus as a share of GDP in percentage points.
OECD (2012) and Eurostat (2012) Public Expenditure
Logarithm of total general government expenditure as a share of GDP in percentage points.
OECD (2013a) and Eurostat (2012)
Inequality Logarithm of the GINI index (that varies between 0, perfect equality, and 100, perfect inequality).
UNU-WIDER (2013)
Growth
Difference between the country's annual per capita income growth rate and the country's mean growth rate in the period 1980-2010 (base year for real per capita income 2005).
Own calculation with data from OECD (2013a) and WDB (2013)
Unemployment
Difference between the country's annual unemployment rate and the country's mean unemployment rate in the period 1980-2010.
Own calculation with data from WDB (2012b)
Note: The measurement of variables refers to the respective survey year if not indicated otherwise. Table 1 summarizes the measurement of the variables and gives detailed information on the sources from which the data is obtained. Table 2 gives some details on descriptive statistics. We observe that there is considerable heterogeneity among countries and parties. For example, Relative Income varies from 17,400 euros below the EU per capita average to 9,800 euros above. Heterogeneity of partisan support for European integration can also be observed in Figure 2 which displays not only differences in mean partisan support across counties and across time periods but also differences in the countries' distribution of partisan support. As mentioned above, because differences in partisan ideology or competition are unlikely to be responsible for this cross-country cross-time variation, economic factors are a possible explanation for the observed heterogeneity in partisan support for European integration. 
Results
The determinants of partisan support for European integration
In what follows we briefly comment on model diagnostics to provide support for the estimation approach adopted. Then, we comment in detail on the estimation results regarding the hypotheses raised in Section 2. Following the literature, in columns 1 and 2 of Following Hellström (2008) , in column 2 we have captured family characteristics using a one dimensional ideology variable for which we confirm a quadratic relationship with parties' contestation over European integration. We find that replacing partisan family by this ideology variable does not significantly decrease the explanatory content of the model, as the respective R 2 of the models in columns 1 and 2 are almost identical.
Therefore, for further analysis we will use this ideological variable to capture partisan family characteristics. Columns 3 and 4 display the estimation results from fixed effects panel data regression (Model 2). While the direction and significance of the diagnosed effects is rather similar to those of Model 1 (with the exception that electoral support becomes insignificant), we find that the existence of fixed effects cannot be rejected from standard F-and Hausman tests with negligible error. Therefore, we regard fixed effects estimation as the appropriate method for further analysis. Note also that in the fixed effects estimation with partisan family and country dummies (column 3 of Table 3) all these dummy variables become insignificant (in comparison to the model estimated in column 1). This also indicates that neither the family nor the country dummies are indicated to capture unobserved heterogeneity among parties. 12 Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. The base categorical variables are Germany (country) and 2010 (year). Table 4 displays the fixed effects estimation results used to contrast the hypotheses stated in Section 2. Column 1 replicates the results of column 4 in Table 3 (Model 2) which, as mentioned above, allow hypotheses 1 and 2 to be confirmed. Columns 2 and 3 contain the second set of variables to test whether the economic benefits and costs of EU membership influence partisan contestation over European integration (Model 3). In the case of hypothesis 3, we find mixed evidence for such an influence. On the one hand, when economic benefits and costs are related to the distance of countries' per capita income from the European mean, we do find that poorer countries (which should be expected to obtain higher net benefits) are more in favour of European integration than richer countries (for whom net benefits will probably be lower Table 2 shows that this corresponds to a change in relative income from -17.40 to 9.80.
GDP) provides rather similar estimation results. 14 Nevertheless, as the impact of relative income is considerable, we consider this as weak evidence in favour of hypothesis 3 and conclude that economic costs and benefits have an influence on partisan positioning towards European integration.
With respect to hypothesis 4, we find that parties in countries that either did not fulfil the 3 percent deficit or the 60 percent debt criterion of the Maastricht Treaty after 1992 manifest lower support for European integration by 7.9% and 6.5%, respectively. For parties in countries that violate both criteria simultaneously, the decrease in partisan support for European integration is slightly larger (8.8%). Since any control of the fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria tends to be rather weak, we use the absolute amount of budget surplus and debt in the estimation in column 3 of Table 4 as an alternative measure for the influence of supranational institutional intervention. We find that an increase in government debt and budget deficit decreases partisan support for European integration. However, the second effect is not significant. We also find that an increase of 10 percentage points in government debt decreases partisan support for European integration by 1%.
Therefore, hypothesis 4 can be accepted, at least regarding government debt.
Parties, then, dislike losing their influence on national fiscal policies because of the creation of European institutions.
The third set of hypotheses is contrasted with Model 4, the estimation results of which are displayed in columns 4 and 5 of 
Time trends in partisan support for European integration
As there have been important institutional changes in the European Union we also study the stability of our estimated model. For this purpose we divide the sample period into two subsample periods. We regard the creation of the EMU in 1999 as an important event that could have affected the determinants of partisan contestation on European integration. Consequently, we reexamine Model 4 in Table 4 for the subsample periods 1984 -1996 and 1999-2010 (Model 6) in Table 5 . we accept hypothesis 4 for the second subsample period.
Our last set of hypotheses takes account of the countries' economic situation.
While we do not find any effect of the size of welfare states on partisan contestation on European integration in our full sample estimation in Model 4, we do find a positive relationship between the size of the welfare state and partisan support for European integration for the second subsample period.
More precisely, we find that Public Expenditure is related to a more favourable contestation on European integration. A one-percent increase in public expenditure increases partisan support for European integration by 0.5%. We find no significant effect of Inequality in either of the subsample periods. From these results we would (weakly) accept hypothesis 5 for the second subsample period.
With regard to hypothesis 6, we find that only Unemployment has a significant influence on partisan contestation on European integration in the first subsample period while for the second subsample period Growth is the only variable with significant impact. Therefore, we confirm the result obtained with Model 4 that the business cycle influences partisan contestation on European integration.
Taken together, the results on the stability of the relationship between partisan support for European integration and its determinants indicate that economic factors have become of increasing importance. On the one hand, partisan support has declined in countries that have been affected by European control of their fiscal policies. But on the other, partisan support for European integration depends on the economic benefits, the size of the welfare state and the current economic situation of a party's country.
Conclusions
In this article we study whether economic factors influence partisan support for European integration. We find that partisan contestation over European integration is indeed affected by several economic variables. First, partisan support is larger in relatively poorer countries indicating that economic benefits from EU membership seem to play an important role. Second, in countries that were affected by the Maastricht criteria partisan support for European integration decreases significantly. We take this as evidence that parties are rather jealous of losing some of their influence on fiscal policies to supranational organizations and therefore reduce their support when this becomes effective. Third, we find weak evidence for larger partisan support in countries with more developed welfare states. Fourth, we detect that support for European integration is in parallel to the business cycle. Finally, our results indicate that the importance of economic factors has grown in recent periods.
Our results have some interesting policy implications for the future of the European integration process in particular and for processes of economic integration in general. First, as partisan support for European integration depends on economic factors, future advances in the European integration process will depend crucially on the economic benefits and their distribution among EU member countries. Second, as it is most likely impossible to obtain positive direct monetary benefits for all members by further integration policies, it becomes particularly important to accentuate the indirect benefits of such policies. For example, our results show that partisan support in those countries with largest benefits from EMU-induced trade is lower than in those countries with smaller benefits. We take this as evidence of the lack of awareness of these indirect benefits to the general public. Finally, while the European integration process unquestionably has its historic specificities, which can be traced back to experiences during and after World War II, it seems that this process, after considerable advances, has now arrived to a 'normal' state of affairs. This teaches us valuable lessons that can be applied to other processes of economic integration. Therefore, for these processes the first two policy implications are also applicable.
